Examining the impact of electoral competition and endogenous lobby formation on equilibrium policy platforms

DOI10.1515/bejte-2020-0085OpenAlexW3117466973MaRDI QIDQ2690336

Deepti Kohli

Publication date: 16 March 2023

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2020-0085

zbMATH Keywords

corruptionelectoral competitionlobby formationequilibrium policyswing voters

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) History, political science (91F10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Compaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies
• Moral hazard and free riding in collective action
• Lobbying and Welfare in a Representative Democracy
• Contributing or free-riding? Voluntary participation in a public good economy

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