Entry deterrence and free riding in license auctions: incumbent heterogeneity and monotonicity

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2020-0143OpenAlexW3138417080MaRDI QIDQ2690337

Biung-Ghi Ju, Seung Han Yoo

Publication date: 16 March 2023

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2020-0143

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric auctionsentry deterrencefree-rider problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Comparative statics of mixed-strategy equilibria in noncooperative two- person games
• A Bertrand model of pricing and entry
• Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium based upon expected utility and quadratic utility
• A Mechanism Design Approach to Ranking Asymmetric Auctions
• David vs. Goliath: An Analysis of Asymmetric Mixed-Strategy Games and Experimental Evidence
• Entry Deterrence and the Free Rider Problem
• Noncooperative Entry Deterrence, Uncertainty, and the Free Rider Problem
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations

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