Passive cross-holding in a Stackelberg oligopoly

DOI10.1515/bejte-2020-0041OpenAlexW3184300021MaRDI QIDQ2690349

Hongkun Ma, Chenhang Zeng

Publication date: 16 March 2023

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2020-0041

zbMATH Keywords

welfareincentiveStackelberg leadershipcross-holding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (2)

Vertical cross‐ownership, input price discrimination, and social welfare ⋮ Losses from cross-holdings in a duopoly with convex cost and strategic input price determination

Cites Work

• Bertrand competition when firms hold passive ownership stakes in one another
• Leading merger in a Stackelberg oligopoly: profitability and consumer welfare
• Passive cross holding as a strategic entry deterrence
• Collusive stability of cross-holding with cost asymmetry
• Partial vertical integration under market uncertainty
• Cross-holdings with asymmetric information and technologies
• Big fish eat small fish: on merger in Stackelberg markets

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