Cheap talk with multiple experts and uncertain biases

DOI10.1515/bejte-2020-0171OpenAlexW3197664792MaRDI QIDQ2690357

Gülen Karakoç

Publication date: 16 March 2023

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2020-0171

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationcheap talkmultiple experts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule
• When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests
• A Model of Expertise
• A Theory of Credibility
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility
• Non-Exclusive Financial Advice

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