Epsilon-efficiency in a dynamic partnership with adverse selection and moral hazard

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2020-0089OpenAlexW3216891894MaRDI QIDQ2690369

Vi Cao

Publication date: 16 March 2023

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2020-0089

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardadverse selectioninterdependent valuesdynamic partnershipepsilon-efficiency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cites Work

• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• Efficiency in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• Efficiency in partnerships
• Linear inequality methods to enforce partnerships under uncertainty: An overview
• Collusion through mediated communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring
• Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships
• The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism
• Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach
• Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: The role of contingent transfers
• Mediated Partnerships
• An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism
• Randomization, Communication, and Efficiency in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

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