Management turnover, strategic ambiguity and supply incentives

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2021-0070OpenAlexW4283371179MaRDI QIDQ2690370

Pascal Toquebeuf, Nicolas Pasquier

Publication date: 16 March 2023

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2021-0070

zbMATH Keywords

strategic ambiguityambiguity attitudevertical contracting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cites Work

• Attitudes to ambiguity in one-shot normal-form games: an experimental study
• Granny versus game theorist: Ambiguity in experimental games

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