Arrowian social equilibrium: indecisiveness, influence and rational social choices under majority rule

DOI10.1515/bejte-2021-0149OpenAlexW4214729540MaRDI QIDQ2690375

Nitesh Singh, Abhinash Borah, Raghvi Garg

Publication date: 16 March 2023

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2021-0149

zbMATH Keywords

majority ruleArrow's impossibility theoremrational shortlist methodArrowian social equilibriumincomplete preferences and indecisivenessrational social choices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Voting operators in the space of choice functions
• Limits on power and rationality
• A comment on Arrow's impossibility theorem
• Choosing on influence

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