Constrained persuasion with private information
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Publication:2690388
DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2021-0017OpenAlexW4282835733MaRDI QIDQ2690388
Publication date: 16 March 2023
Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2021-0017
Cites Work
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- Sequential Equilibria
- Strategic Information Transmission
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
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