Relative income concerns, dismissal, and the use of pay-for-performance

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2021-0107OpenAlexW4293053264MaRDI QIDQ2690391

Harvey Upton, Dominique Demougin

Publication date: 16 March 2023

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2021-0107

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardincentive contractingpay-for-performancerelative income concerns

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Labor markets (91B39) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cites Work

• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion
• Distributions for the first-order approach to principal-agent problems
• Optimal incentive contracts under relative income concerns
• A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences*
• FRAMING OF INCENTIVES AND EFFORT PROVISION
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Social Preferences, Sorting, and Competition*
• Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model
• The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment
• Ranking of information systems in agency models: an integral condition

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