Delegation in vertical relationships: the role of reciprocity
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Publication:2690392
DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2020-0197OpenAlexW4283455989MaRDI QIDQ2690392
Publication date: 16 March 2023
Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2020-0197
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)
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