Delegation in vertical relationships: the role of reciprocity

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2020-0197OpenAlexW4283455989MaRDI QIDQ2690392

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 16 March 2023

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2020-0197

zbMATH Keywords

reciprocitydelegationvertical integrationliquidity constraintsmarket exchange

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cites Work

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• Reciprocity networks and the participation problem
• Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
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• Reciprocity in the principal-multiple agent model
• Gratitude, conscience, and reciprocity: models of supplier motivation when quality is non-contractible
• Agreements with reciprocity: co-financing and MOUs
• A theory of sequential reciprocity
• Trust, reciprocity, and social history
• Optimal incentives under gift exchange
• Tacit collusion under fairness and reciprocity
• A theory of reciprocity
• Optimal Contracting Model in a Social Environment and Trust-Related Psychological Costs
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts

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