The supervision game of economically motivated adulteration behavior of fresh agricultural product suppliers

DOI10.3934/JIMO.2022153OpenAlexW4293215955MaRDI QIDQ2691420

Yurong Liang, Cuixai Wang

Publication date: 29 March 2023

Published in: Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jimo.2022153

zbMATH Keywords

fresh agricultural productstripartite gamecollaborative supervisioneconomically motivated adulterationquality safety

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Mathematical modeling or simulation for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-10)

Cites Work

• Push or Pull? Perishable Products with Freshness-Keeping Effort
• Unnamed Item

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