Multidimensional stable roommates with master list

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-64946-3_5OpenAlexW3114655639MaRDI QIDQ2692267

Dušan Knop, Klaus Heeger, Robert Bredereck, Rolf Niedermeier

Publication date: 21 March 2023

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.14191

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)

Related Items (8)

The three-dimensional stable roommates problem with additively separable preferences ⋮ Hedonic diversity games: a complexity picture with more than two colors ⋮ Recognizing when a preference system is close to admitting a master list ⋮ Strategyproof mechanism for two-sided matching with resource allocation ⋮ Stable matching with multilayer approval preferences: approvals can be harder than strict preferences ⋮ Recognizing when a preference system is close to admitting a master list ⋮ Stable matching with multilayer approval preferences: approvals can be harder than strict preferences ⋮ Parameterized complexity of stable roommates with ties and incomplete lists through the lens of graph parameters

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