Fair division with binary valuations: one rule to rule them all

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-64946-3_26OpenAlexW3115959263MaRDI QIDQ2692296

Alexandros Psomas, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah, Daniel Halpern

Publication date: 21 March 2023

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.06073

zbMATH Keywords

fair divisionmechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)

Related Items (11)

Approximating Nash social welfare under binary XOS and binary subadditive valuations ⋮ On maximum weighted Nash welfare for binary valuations ⋮ Computing welfare-maximizing fair allocations of indivisible goods ⋮ Fair division of indivisible goods: recent progress and open questions ⋮ Fairly taking turns ⋮ On existence of truthful fair cake cutting mechanisms ⋮ On best-of-both-worlds fair-share allocations ⋮ Nash welfare guarantees for fair and efficient coverage ⋮ Weighted fair division with matroid-rank valuations: monotonicity and strategyproofness ⋮ Allocating indivisible items with minimum dissatisfaction on preference graphs ⋮ Picking sequences and monotonicity in weighted fair division

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