On the strong \(\beta\)-hybrid solution of an \(N\)-person game
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Publication:2694751
DOI10.1007/s11238-022-09900-0OpenAlexW4289866238MaRDI QIDQ2694751
Bertrand Crettez, Tarik Tazdaït, Rabia Nessah
Publication date: 4 April 2023
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-022-09900-0
coalition structurehybrid solution\(N\)-person game\(\alpha\)-core\(\beta\)-corestrong hybrid solution
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