Mechanism design for facility location with fractional preferences and minimum distance

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-89543-3_42OpenAlexW3208819508MaRDI QIDQ2695319

Longteng Duan, Zifan Gong, Xiaoying Wu, Minming Li, Chen-Hao Wang

Publication date: 30 March 2023

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89543-3_42

zbMATH Keywords

approximationfacility locationmechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Discrete mathematics in relation to computer science (68Rxx)

Cites Work

• Strategyproof facility location for concave cost functions
• Strategy-proof approximation mechanisms for an obnoxious facility game on networks
• Mechanism design for two-opposite-facility location games with penalties on distance
• Tight efficiency lower bounds for strategy-proof mechanisms in two-opposite-facility location game
• Mechanism design for facility location games with candidate locations
• Strategy-Proof Mechanism for Obnoxious Facility Location on a Line
• Facility location games with optional preference
• Approximately Optimal Mechanisms for Strategyproof Facility Location: Minimizing L_p Norm of Costs

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