Obvious manipulability of voting rules

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-87756-9_12OpenAlexW3209773503MaRDI QIDQ2695439

Alexander Lam, Haris Aziz

Publication date: 31 March 2023

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2111.01983

zbMATH Keywords

votingsocial choicestrategyproofnessmanipulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Problem solving in the context of artificial intelligence (heuristics, search strategies, etc.) (68T20) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (2)

Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules ⋮ Obvious manipulations in cake-cutting

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Is it ever safe to vote strategically?
• A note on manipulability of large voting schemes
• Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation.
• Obvious manipulations
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Barriers to Manipulation in Voting

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