The nonmanipulative vote-deficits of voting rules

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-87756-9_15OpenAlexW3209986364MaRDI QIDQ2695443

Yongjie Yang

Publication date: 31 March 2023

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-87756-9_15

zbMATH Keywords

maximintournamentsvoting rulesmanipulationCopelandBordanonmanipulative vote-deficitsplurality with runoff

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Problem solving in the context of artificial intelligence (heuristics, search strategies, etc.) (68T20) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14) Matching models (91B68)

Uses Software

• PrefLib

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions
• A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method
• Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
• How hard is it to control an election?
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
• \(k\)-majority digraphs and the hardness of voting with a constant number of voters
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Control and Bribery in Voting
• Exact algorithms for weighted and unweighted Borda manipulation problems

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