Lazy Gale-Shapley for many-to-one matching with partial information

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-87756-9_25OpenAlexW3209333255MaRDI QIDQ2695460

Ryoji Wada, Makoto Yokoo, Taiki Todo, Kentaro Yahiro

Publication date: 31 March 2023

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-87756-9_25

zbMATH Keywords

partial informationtwo-sided matchingmany-to-one matchingGale-Shapley algorithmpartial preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Problem solving in the context of artificial intelligence (heuristics, search strategies, etc.) (68T20) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14) Matching models (91B68)

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• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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