‘Neo-Logicist‘ Logic is not Epistemically Innocent

DOI10.1093/PHILMAT/8.2.160zbMath0966.03002OpenAlexW2068998339MaRDI QIDQ2702946

Stewart Shapiro, Alan Weir

Publication date: 7 May 2001

Published in: Philosophia Mathematica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/8.2.160

zbMATH Keywords

abstraction principlesepistemic innocence of mathematicsfirst-order existential instantiationneo-logicistsecond-order axiom of comprehensionuniversal elimination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophy of mathematics (00A30) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Related Items (8)

FREGE’S THEORY OF REAL NUMBERS: A CONSISTENT RENDERING ⋮ In defence of higher-level plural logic: drawing conclusions from natural language ⋮ Neo-Fregeanism: an embarrassment of riches ⋮ Double vision: two questions about the neo-Fregean program ⋮ Focus restored: Comments on John MacFarlane ⋮ Hume's big brother: Counting concepts and the bad company objection ⋮ IN GOOD COMPANY? ON HUME’S PRINCIPLE AND THE ASSIGNMENT OF NUMBERS TO INFINITE CONCEPTS ⋮ Realism and paradox

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