EXPECTATIONS, CREDIBILITY, AND TIME-CONSISTENT MONETARY POLICY

DOI10.1017/S1365100500017028zbMath1038.91546OpenAlexW3124712366MaRDI QIDQ2704140

Peter N. Ireland

Publication date: 2000

Published in: Macroeconomic Dynamics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/s1365100500017028

zbMATH Keywords

expectationscredibilitymonetary policytime consistency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Related Items (3)

The time inconsistency of delegation-based time inconsistency solutions in monetary policy ⋮ Time consistent monetary policy with endogenous price rigidity ⋮ Recursive monetary policy games with incomplete information

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