Characterizations of weighted and equal division values
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Publication:272160
DOI10.1007/s11238-015-9519-7zbMath1378.91012OpenAlexW2303152797MaRDI QIDQ272160
Frank Huettner, Sylvain Béal, André Casajus, Philippe Solal, Eric Rémila
Publication date: 20 April 2016
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-015-9519-7
addition invariance on bi-partitionsequal divisionnon-negative playernullified solidarityweighted division values
Related Items
Coalitional desirability and the equal division value ⋮ Sharing the surplus and proportional values ⋮ Necessary versus equal players in axiomatic studies ⋮ The weighted-egalitarian Shapley values ⋮ Effects of Players’ Nullification and Equal (Surplus) Division Values ⋮ A new axiomatization of a class of equal surplus division values for TU games ⋮ Discounted tree solutions ⋮ Uncertainty in cooperative interval games: how Hurwicz criterion compatibility leads to egalitarianism ⋮ The equal-surplus Shapley value for chance-constrained games on finite sample spaces ⋮ Axiomatizations of the proportional division value ⋮ Weakly differentially monotonic solutions for cooperative games
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