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scientific article - MaRDI portal

scientific article

From MaRDI portal
Publication:2721985

zbMath0966.91500MaRDI QIDQ2721985

Robert W. Irving, David F. Manlove, Sandy Scott

Publication date: 11 July 2001


Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.



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