Optimal Contracting with Private Knowledge of Wealth and Ability

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00158zbMath0994.91035OpenAlexW1973559670MaRDI QIDQ2729258

David E. M. Sappington, Tracy R. Lewis

Publication date: 28 September 2002

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00158

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationentrepreneurshipoptimal contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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