Lobbying and Welfare in a Representative Democracy

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00160zbMath0979.91083OpenAlexW2143376017MaRDI QIDQ2729261

Stephen Coate, Timothy Besley

Publication date: 18 July 2001

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00160

zbMATH Keywords

lobbyingrepresentative democracyvoterspolicy choices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (7)

Citizen-candidates, lobbies, and strategic campaigning ⋮ Policy bias equivalence under common agency ⋮ Optimal lobbying pricing ⋮ Examining the impact of electoral competition and endogenous lobby formation on equilibrium policy platforms ⋮ LOBBYING AND ELECTIONS ⋮ Citizens or lobbies: who controls policy? ⋮ Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency

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