Tiebout with Politics: Capital Tax Competition and Constitutional Choices

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00163zbMath0979.91072OpenAlexW1995081038MaRDI QIDQ2729265

Carlo Perroni, Kimberley A. Scharf

Publication date: 23 September 2001

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00163

zbMATH Keywords

majority votingcapital tax competitionjurisdiction formation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (1)

On the (sequential) majority choice of public good size and location

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