Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders
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Publication:2729266
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00164zbMath1114.91314OpenAlexW1968220721MaRDI QIDQ2729266
Vijay Krishna, Jean-Pierre Benoît
Publication date: 18 July 2001
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00164
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