Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.01.002zbMath1347.91021OpenAlexW2255409560MaRDI QIDQ274053

Sylvain Ferrières, Philippe Solal, Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila

Publication date: 22 April 2016

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://crese.univ-fcomte.fr/uploads/wp/WP-2015-06.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (12)

The proportional Shapley value and applications ⋮ The balanced contributions property for equal contributors ⋮ Membership separability: a new axiomatization of the Shapley value ⋮ Sharing the surplus and proportional values ⋮ Impacts of boycotts concerning the Shapley value and extensions ⋮ Players' dummification and the dummified egalitarian non-separable contribution value ⋮ Potentials and solutions of cooperative games with a fixed player set ⋮ Marginality and the position value ⋮ Nullified equal loss property and equal division values ⋮ Effects of Players’ Nullification and Equal (Surplus) Division Values ⋮ Equal loss under separatorization and egalitarian values ⋮ Balanced contributions based on indirect claims and the Shapley value

Cites Work

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