On the relationship between uniqueness and stability in sum-aggregative, symmetric and general differentiable games

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.02.008zbMath1347.91015OpenAlexW2290200628MaRDI QIDQ274064

Andreas Hefti

Publication date: 22 April 2016

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.02.008

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items (5)

A differentiable characterization of local contractions on Banach spaces ⋮ A strong correspondence principle for smooth, monotone environments ⋮ On the existence of stable equilibria in monotone games ⋮ A necessary and sufficient condition for a unique maximum with an application to potential games ⋮ Uniqueness, stability and comparative statics for two-person Bayesian games with strategic substitutes

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