COEXISTENCE OR EXCLUSION IN A COMPETITIVE COMMON-POOL FISHERY: A REVISIONIST VIEW

DOI10.1111/j.1939-7445.1999.tb00021.xzbMath1017.91073OpenAlexW2170756867MaRDI QIDQ2745387

Robert McKelvey

Publication date: 3 September 2003

Published in: Natural Resource Modeling (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1939-7445.1999.tb00021.x

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumfleetsdynamic harvesting game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (1)

Existence of Nash equilibria for constrained stochastic games

Cites Work

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• Nonuniqueness of no-memory feedback equilibria in a fishery resource game
• A concept of cooperative equilibrium for dynamic games
• THE OPTIMAL MANAGEMENT OF TRANSBOUNDARY FISHERIES: GAME THEORETIC CONSIDERATIONS
• The Optimal Exploitation of Renewable Resource Stocks: Problems of Irreversible Investment

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