ON OPTIMAL ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION AND ENFORCEMENT: INFORMATION, MONITORING AND EFFICIENCY

DOI10.1111/J.1939-7445.2001.TB00048.XzbMath0994.91053OpenAlexW2054237739MaRDI QIDQ2747962

Carlos Mario Gómez Gómez

Publication date: 14 October 2001

Published in: Natural Resource Modeling (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1939-7445.2001.tb00048.x

zbMATH Keywords

optimal taxationmechanism designasymmetric and private informationenvironmental economicseconomics of regulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Cites Work

• Guilty until proven innocent -- regulation with costly and limited enforcement
• Tax deductions, environmental policy, and the double dividend hypothesis
• On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation

This page was built for publication: ON OPTIMAL ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION AND ENFORCEMENT: INFORMATION, MONITORING AND EFFICIENCY