Collusion properties of coalition values for games in characteristic function form

DOI10.1016/j.amc.2014.04.004zbMath1334.91013OpenAlexW2052544038MaRDI QIDQ275140

Kentaro Kojima

Publication date: 25 April 2016

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2014.04.004

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamesgame theorycollusioncoalition value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

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• A new axiom and interrelationships among coalition values for games in characteristic function form
• Collective behavior and evolutionary games -- an introduction
• On connections between individual values and coalition values for games in characteristic function form
• A new binary relation to compare viability of winning coalitions and its interrelationships to desirability relation and blockability relation
• A class of simple games
• The desirability relation of simple games
• On the reduced game property and its converse
• Collusion properties of values
• A method to compare influence of coalitions on group decision other than desirability relation
• Coalition values derived from methods for comparison of coalition influence for games in characteristic function form
• A characterization, existence proof and dimension bounds for the kernel of a game
• Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games

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