scientific article
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2757759
zbMath0991.91002MaRDI QIDQ2757759
Publication date: 3 December 2001
Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items (26)
The topological approach to the aggregation of preferences ⋮ Voting theory in the Lean theorem prover ⋮ Which dictatorial domains are superdictatorial? A complete characterization for the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility ⋮ Weak independence and the Pareto principle ⋮ Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation ⋮ First-order logic formalisation of impossibility theorems in preference aggregation ⋮ On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference ⋮ Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel ⋮ Restricting the domain allows for weaker independence ⋮ Fuzzy aggregation in economic environments: I. Quantitative fuzziness, public goods and monotonicity assumptions. ⋮ Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes ⋮ Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule ⋮ Condorcet's principle and the strong no-show paradoxes ⋮ Voting Procedures, Complexity of ⋮ Nash implementable domains for the Borda count ⋮ The single-peaked domain revisited: a simple global characterization ⋮ Majority voting on restricted domains ⋮ Pareto efficiency with spatial rights ⋮ On social welfare functionals: representation theorems and equivalence classes ⋮ Anonymous monotonic social welfare functions ⋮ Assigning numerical scores to linguistic expressions ⋮ Extremal Restriction, Condorcet Sets, and Majority Decision Making ⋮ Diversity and rights: a social choice-theoretic analysis of the possibility of public reason ⋮ Strategyproof judgment aggregation under partial information ⋮ The limitations of the Arrovian consistency of domains with a fixed preference ⋮ Social Choice Theory
This page was built for publication:
