A method to bypass the lack of solutions in minsup problems under quasi-equilibrium constraints
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Publication:276338
DOI10.1007/s11590-015-0956-6zbMath1368.90176OpenAlexW1943800865MaRDI QIDQ276338
Jacqueline Morgan, M. Beatrice Lignola
Publication date: 3 May 2016
Published in: Optimization Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11590-015-0956-6
Minimax problems in mathematical programming (90C47) Complementarity and equilibrium problems and variational inequalities (finite dimensions) (aspects of mathematical programming) (90C33)
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Inner regularizations and viscosity solutions for pessimistic bilevel optimization problems ⋮ A Practical Scheme to Compute the Pessimistic Bilevel Optimization Problem ⋮ Regularization and Approximation Methods in Stackelberg Games and Bilevel Optimization
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