Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are

DOI10.1162/00335530152466269zbMath0989.91057OpenAlexW2068658192WikidataQ56484924 ScholiaQ56484924MaRDI QIDQ2765518

Marianne Bertrand, Sendhil Mullainathan

Publication date: 16 June 2002

Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1162/00335530152466269

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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