ON THE SEMIVALUES AND THE POWER CORE OF COOPERATIVE TU GAMES

DOI10.1142/S0219198901000324zbMath0991.91004MaRDI QIDQ2772847

Irinel Dragan, Juan-Enrique Martinez-Legaz

Publication date: 11 April 2002

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueTU gamespower core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Power and potential maps induced by any semivalue: some algebraic properties and computation by multilinear extensions

Cites Work

• Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility
• The Shapley value and average convex games
• The coalitional rationality of the Shapley value
• Potentials in cooperative TU-games
• New mathematical properties of the Banzhaf value
• Prosperty properties of TU-games
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• Value Theory Without Efficiency