A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.03.009zbMath1347.91138OpenAlexW2341342409MaRDI QIDQ277315

Yong Li, Jianxin Yi

Publication date: 4 May 2016

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:386058/UQ386058_OA.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Designing efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms is almost impossible in quasi-linear environments

Cites Work

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