Repeated Bargaining with Persistent Private Information

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00188zbMath1005.91068OpenAlexW2041776872MaRDI QIDQ2775920

John Kennan

Publication date: 28 February 2002

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00188

zbMATH Keywords

informationrepeated bargainingrepeated contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

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Union Leaders as Experts: Wage Bargaining and Strikes with Union-Wide Ballot Requirements* ⋮ Public trust and government betrayal ⋮ IMMEDIATE SETTLEMENT OR ENDURING A STRIKE: THE CHOICE OF SIGNALS ⋮ Bargaining with evolving private information ⋮ Setting Nash Versus Kalai–Smorodinsky Bargaining Approach: Computing the Continuous-Time Controllable Markov Game ⋮ Optimality and renegotiation in dynamic contracting ⋮ Price experimentation with strategic buyers ⋮ Dynamic bargaining with action-dependent valuations ⋮ Selling or leasing? Dynamic pricing of software with upgrades ⋮ Compromise is key in infinitely repeated bargaining with an evergreen clause ⋮ Holdup and innovation

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