Selection into and across credit contracts: theory and field research

DOI10.1016/J.JECONOM.2005.11.013zbMath1418.62404OpenAlexW2004321427WikidataQ56852507 ScholiaQ56852507MaRDI QIDQ278281

Christian Ahlin, Robert M. Townsend

Publication date: 2 May 2016

Published in: Journal of Econometrics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1803/15747

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionmechanism designempirical contract theoryjoint liabilitymicro-credit

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to economics (62P20)

Related Items (4)

Observability and endogenous organizations ⋮ Group lending with correlated project outcomes ⋮ Endogenous groups and dynamic selection in mechanism design ⋮ Optimal Group Size in Joint Liability Contracts

Cites Work

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• Path independent inequality measures.
• Collective organizations versus relative performance contracts: Inequality, risk sharing, and moral hazard
• Root-N-Consistent Semiparametric Regression
• Robust Locally Weighted Regression and Smoothing Scatterplots
• Design-adaptive Nonparametric Regression
• Is Grameen Lending Efficient? Repayment Incentives and Insurance in Village Economies

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