EFFORT SUBSIDIES AND ENTRY DETERRENCE IN TRANSBOUNDARY FISHERIES

DOI10.1111/J.1939-7445.2001.TB00063.XzbMath1051.91079OpenAlexW2040972910MaRDI QIDQ2783630

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Publication date: 2001

Published in: Natural Resource Modeling (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1939-7445.2001.tb00063.x

zbMATH Keywords

noncooperative gamesentry deterrencefisheries subsidies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (2)

COALITIONS IN INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT ⋮ HUMAN FERTILITY DECISIONS AND COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES: A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS

Cites Work

• Noncooperative solutions for a differential game model of fishery
• International fish wars: The strategic roles for fleet licensing and effort subsidies
• Entry deterrence and overexploitation of the fishery
• GAME-THEORETIC RESOURCE MODELING
• Entry Deterrence in the Commons

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