Nonatomic games on Loeb spaces
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Publication:2785377
DOI10.1073/pnas.93.26.15518zbMath0868.90145OpenAlexW2112511672WikidataQ37099629 ScholiaQ37099629MaRDI QIDQ2785377
Publication date: 20 February 1997
Published in: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.93.26.15518
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Cites Work
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