Incentive strategies with threats in dynamic constrained-stackelberg problems. a bilevel programming approach

DOI10.1080/02331939608844253zbMath0868.90148OpenAlexW2168616681MaRDI QIDQ2785404

F. Mignanego, Anna Sciomachen

Publication date: 18 August 1997

Published in: Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/02331939608844253

zbMATH Keywords

bilevel mathematical programmingdynamic constrained-Stackelberg equilibrium problemsincentive strategies with threats

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Differential games and control (49N70) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Hierarchical systems (93A13) Pursuit and evasion games (49N75)

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Cites Work

• Dynamic noncooperative game theory
• A penalty function approach for solving bi-level linear programs
• Bilevel linear programming
• A solution method for the static constrained Stackelberg problem via penalty method
• A Branch and Bound Algorithm for the Bilevel Programming Problem
• A Representation and Economic Interpretation of a Two-Level Programming Problem
• On the inverse of matrices with nearly equal elements