Non-malleability Under Selective Opening Attacks: Implication and Separation

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-28166-7_5zbMath1459.94115OpenAlexW2294431509MaRDI QIDQ2794495

Xianping Mao, Zhengan Huang, Shengli Liu, Ke-Fei Chen

Publication date: 10 March 2016

Published in: Applied Cryptography and Network Security (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28166-7_5

zbMATH Keywords

public-key encryptionnon-malleabilityselective opening attack

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

Related Items (2)

Receiver selective opening security for identity-based encryption in the multi-challenge setting ⋮ Practical public key encryption with selective opening security for receivers

Cites Work

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• Lossy Encryption: Constructions from General Assumptions and Efficient Selective Opening Chosen Ciphertext Security
• Relations Among Notions of Non-malleability for Encryption
• Encryption Schemes Secure against Chosen-Ciphertext Selective Opening Attacks
• Possibility and Impossibility Results for Encryption and Commitment Secure under Selective Opening
• Design and Analysis of Practical Public-Key Encryption Schemes Secure against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack
• Nonmalleable Cryptography
• Sender-Equivocable Encryption Schemes Secure against Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks Revisited
• Standard versus Selective Opening Security: Separation and Equivalence Results

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