Automated Design of Revenue-Maximizing Combinatorial Auctions

DOI10.1287/opre.2015.1398zbMath1347.91163OpenAlexW1844580627MaRDI QIDQ2795862

Anton Likhodedov, Tuomas W. Sandholm

Publication date: 22 March 2016

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2015.1398

zbMATH Keywords

combinatorial auctionrevenue maximizationoptimal auctionautomated mechanism design (AMD)parametric mechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (10)

Revenue Maximizing Markets for Zero-Day Exploits ⋮ Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting ⋮ Solving the winner determination problem in combinatorial auctions for fractional ownership of autonomous vehicles ⋮ Discovering theorems in game theory: two-person games with unique pure Nash equilibrium payoffs ⋮ Reducing mechanism design to algorithm design via machine learning ⋮ When Analysis Fails: Heuristic Mechanism Design via Self-correcting Procedures ⋮ Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions ⋮ Automated Design of Revenue-Maximizing Combinatorial Auctions ⋮ Robust Auctions for Revenue via Enhanced Competition ⋮ Mechanism Design for Correlated Valuations: Efficient Methods for Revenue Maximization

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