Automated Design of Revenue-Maximizing Combinatorial Auctions
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Publication:2795862
DOI10.1287/opre.2015.1398zbMath1347.91163OpenAlexW1844580627MaRDI QIDQ2795862
Anton Likhodedov, Tuomas W. Sandholm
Publication date: 22 March 2016
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2015.1398
combinatorial auctionrevenue maximizationoptimal auctionautomated mechanism design (AMD)parametric mechanism design
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