Truthful Mechanisms with Implicit Payment Computation

DOI10.1145/2724705zbMath1333.91013arXiv1004.3630OpenAlexW2199516650MaRDI QIDQ2796397

Moshe Babaioff, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Robert D. Kleinberg

Publication date: 24 March 2016

Published in: Journal of the ACM (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1004.3630

zbMATH Keywords

regretalgorithmic mechanism designmulti-armed banditsmultiparameter mechanismssingle-parameter mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Stopping times; optimal stopping problems; gambling theory (60G40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (10)

Bayesian Exploration: Incentivizing Exploration in Bayesian Games ⋮ A truthful mechanism for value-based scheduling in cloud computing ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ An optimal bidimensional multi-armed bandit auction for multi-unit procurement ⋮ Truthful Mechanisms with Implicit Payment Computation ⋮ Mechanisms with learning for stochastic multi-armed bandit problems ⋮ Bayesian Incentive-Compatible Bandit Exploration ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax and Round ⋮ Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions

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