Dynamic Pricing of Peak Production
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Publication:2797449
DOI10.1287/opre.2015.1429zbMath1347.91147OpenAlexW1961340400MaRDI QIDQ2797449
Publication date: 5 April 2016
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10044/1/51985
Applications of game theory (91A80) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Inventory, storage, reservoirs (90B05)
Cites Work
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