Deregulated electricity markets with thermal losses and production bounds: models and optimality conditions

DOI10.1051/ro/2015009zbMath1333.91045OpenAlexW2006947718MaRDI QIDQ2798110

Michal Červinka, Matthieu Marechal, Didier Aussel

Publication date: 1 April 2016

Published in: RAIRO - Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/2015009

zbMATH Keywords

calmnessmathematical program with complementarity constraintsderegulated electricity marketM-stationarityproduction bounds

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Nonlinear programming (90C30) Set-valued and variational analysis (49J53) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74)

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