Auction Revenue in the General Spiteful-Utility Model

DOI10.1145/2840728.2840741zbMath1334.91039OpenAlexW2296662825MaRDI QIDQ2800566

Jing Chen, Silvio Micali

Publication date: 15 April 2016

Published in: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/2840728.2840741

zbMATH Keywords

externalityrevenuespitefulnessundominated strategylight Bayesian settingsingle-good auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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