ASYMMETRY OF CUSTOMER LOSS AND RECOVERY UNDER ENDOGENOUS PARTNERSHIPS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE*
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Publication:2802705
DOI10.1111/iere.12146zbMath1404.91180OpenAlexW2430365843WikidataQ67195686 ScholiaQ67195686MaRDI QIDQ2802705
Henrich R. Greve, Stefan Jonsson, Takako Fujiwara-Greve
Publication date: 27 April 2016
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-231539
Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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