EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF EQUILIBRIUM FOR A SPATIAL MODEL OF SOCIAL INTERACTIONS*

DOI10.1111/iere.12147zbMath1404.91220OpenAlexW2221501395MaRDI QIDQ2802706

Pascal Mossay, Filippo Santambrogio, Adrien Blanchet

Publication date: 27 April 2016

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12147

zbMATH Keywords

social interactionsspatial economyspatial equilibriaBeckmann's spatial model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Related Items (13)

Convexity of the support of the displacement interpolation: counterexamples ⋮ Dealing with moment measures via entropy and optimal transport ⋮ Equilibrium refinement for a model of non-monocentric internal structures of cities: a potential game approach ⋮ Large-scale dynamics of mean-field games driven by local Nash equilibria ⋮ A simple city equilibrium model with an application to teleworking ⋮ q-Moment Measures and Applications: A New Approach via Optimal Transport ⋮ JKO estimates in linear and non-linear Fokker-Planck equations, and Keller-Segel: \(L^p\) and Sobolev bounds ⋮ Local social interaction and urban equilibria ⋮ Stability of a spatial model of social interactions ⋮ Discrete-space agglomeration model with social interactions: multiplicity, stability, and continuous limit of equilibria ⋮ A Cucker--Smale Inspired Deterministic Mean Field Game with Velocity Interactions ⋮ Evolution of the distribution of wealth in an economic environment driven by local Nash equilibria ⋮ Optimal Transport and Cournot-Nash Equilibria

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Games of social interactions with local and global externalities
• On spatial equilibria in a social interaction model
• Production externalities and urban configuration
• Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games
• A convexity principle for interacting gases
• Potential games
• Aggregative games and best-reply potentials
• General equilibrium models of monopolistic competition: a new approach
• Monopolistic Competition: Beyond the Constant Elasticity of Substitution
• Polar factorization and monotone rearrangement of vector‐valued functions
• On the Internal Structure of Cities
• Optimal Transport
• Direct methods in the calculus of variations

This page was built for publication: EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF EQUILIBRIUM FOR A SPATIAL MODEL OF SOCIAL INTERACTIONS*