Quantitative Notions of Leakage for One-try Attacks

DOI10.1016/j.entcs.2009.07.085zbMath1337.94006OpenAlexW2167136065MaRDI QIDQ2805152

Catuscia Palamidessi, Christelle Braun, Konstantinos Chatzikokolakis

Publication date: 10 May 2016

Published in: Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.entcs.2009.07.085

zbMATH Keywords

hypothesis testingprobability of errorinformation-hidingRényi min-entropy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Measures of information, entropy (94A17) Information theory (general) (94A15) Channel models (including quantum) in information and communication theory (94A40)

Related Items (16)

Quantifying leakage in the presence of unreliable sources of information ⋮ A better composition operator for quantitative information flow analyses ⋮ Min-entropy as a resource ⋮ On the Additive Capacity Problem for Quantitative Information Flow ⋮ Masking primal and dual models for data privacy in network revenue management ⋮ Searching secrets rationally ⋮ Quantitative information flow as safety and liveness hyperproperties ⋮ Analyzing anonymity attacks through noisy channels ⋮ On the Relation between Differential Privacy and Quantitative Information Flow ⋮ Information Theory and Security: Quantitative Information Flow ⋮ Generalized Differential Privacy: Regions of Priors That Admit Robust Optimal Mechanisms ⋮ Asymptotic information leakage under one-try attacks ⋮ Hidden-Markov program algebra with iteration ⋮ Information hiding in probabilistic concurrent systems ⋮ An algebraic approach for reasoning about information flow ⋮ Worst- and average-case privacy breaches in randomization mechanisms

Cites Work

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• Anonymity protocols as noisy channels
• Quantitative Information Flow, Relations and Polymorphic Types
• Assessing security threats of looping constructs
• Fuzzy Extractors: How to Generate Strong Keys from Biometrics and Other Noisy Data
• On the Foundations of Quantitative Information Flow

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